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Abstract
There are several Identity Meta Systems emerging in
the identity management field, such as CardSpace and
Higgins Trust Framework. The goal of an Identity
Meta System (IMetS) is to integrate existing or new
Identity Management System (IMS) to provide users
with seamless interoperability and a consistent user
experience. IMetS is a complex system that tries to
integrate the already complicated IMS services. With
such a complex system, we need a way to assess IMetS
in order to determine how well an IMetS integrates
the various IMS services. However, as IMetS is a rela-
tively new concept, there is no framework to identify
the properties that an ideal IMetS should have. The
contribution of this paper is to introduce the Lay-
ered Identity Infrastructure Model (LIIM) that can
be used as a framework to assess IMetS. In addition,
the LIIM framework can also be used to identify the
missing components of an IMetS, to guide and im-
prove the design of an existing IMetS, to serve as a
design benchmark for a new IMetS, as well as to aid
the understanding of a complicated IMetS.
Keywords: identity management, identity meta-
system, identity model, Higgins, Cardspace, OpenID
1 Introduction
There has been a push toward a user-centric system in
the field of identity management system (IMS). This
system aims at providing an identity management
system that is usable from the users’ point of view. It
allows the users to control the use of their personal in-
formation (Kearns 2005, 2006). Consistent with this
approach, Identity Meta System (IMetS) has been de-
veloped. IMetS is a system that enables interoper-
ability between various IMS technologies, implemen-
tations and providers (Microsoft 2005a, 2006). The
idea is to hide the underlying differences of various
IMSs to provide the users with a single interface to
use in their identity management activities and to en-
able a consistent user experience.
IMetS is not an IMS, and the purpose of IMetS is
not to replace or provide new functionalities (such
as authentication and single sign-on) like an IMS.
Rather, IMetS provides a structure in which various
IMSs can be joined together to enable interoperabil-
ity between them, and to provide a single user inter-
face, regardless of the underlying differences of the
IMSs joined. IMetS does not and should not, replace
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the functionalities or services that the joined IMSs
have provided. For example, an IMetS could join an
OpenID (Recordon & Fitzpatrick 2006) and Liberty
Identity Federation (Alliance 2004b), but that IMetS
should not impose or replace any of the services that
these two IMSs have provided, that is, services such
as the OpenID authentication or Liberty Single Sign-
On protocol (Alliance 2004a,b) should remain intact.
However, from the users’ point of view, they are un-
aware of the differences because they only have a sin-
gle interface to interact with.
In short, the main goal of an IMetS is to give
the users of IMetS the illusion that they are dealing
with one identity management system only by hid-
ing the underlying differences between various IMSs
joined - such as the differences in the protocols used,
the policy representations, as well as how and where
the users’ information is actually stored and repre-
sented. On the other hand, the main goal of an IMS
is to provide the actual identity management services,
such as authentication, single sign-on, dissemination
of users’ attributes, privacy protections, access con-
trol and repository of the users’ information.
However, attempting to join these various IMSs is
challenging because the IMSs themselves are compli-
cated systems consisting of various components, pro-
tocols (Kerberos, Microsoft’s Passport), and services
(such as single sign on, access control and others).
Given the goal of IMetS and the complexity of IMSs,
it is important that we can identify the components
of IMSs that an IMetS should integrate and have a
way to measure how well an IMetS could do so. To
these ends, a model is needed to provide a framework
for the analysis and evaluation of various IMetS.
Unfortunately, there is currently no useful model
to do so. While there are some models for IMS (such
as those proposed by Mont et al (Mont et al. 2002)
and Overbeek (Overbeek 2006)), they are not usable
for evaluating IMetS. Therefore, the contribution of
this paper is to introduce a model that could be used
to assess IMetS. This model is called the Layered
Identity Infrastructure Model (LIIM). In addition, to
show the applicability and usefulness of LIIM, two
current IMetSs: CardSpace and Higgins, will be de-
scribed and evaluated using the LIIM framework.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 pro-
vides the necessary background information of ex-
isting IMetS, such as CardSpace and Higgins Trust
Framework. For later discussion, a description of one
IMS (OpenID) is provided. This section also pro-
vides a brief explanation of the previous attempts to
model IMS and show their shortcomings to be used
for IMetS evaluation, and thus, the need for the LIIM
framework. Section 3 introduces LIIM and the re-
quirements for each of the LIIM’s layers. Examples
are given to show how each of the LIIM layers fits
into CardSpace and Higgins systems. Section 4 pro-
vides an explanation of how the LIIM framework can
be used to assess IMetS. Examples of Higgins and
CardSpace evaluation using the LIIM framework are
provided, including the evaluation results. Section 5
provides a discussion of the LIIM framework’s valid-
ity by showing how OpenID can be integrated with
Higgins and CardSpace, and how the integration sce-
narios support the results from the evaluation of Hig-
gins and CardSpace from the previuos section 4. A
conclusion is provided in section 6.
2 Related Works
This section describes some existing IMetSs, such as
CardSpace and Higgins, as well as a promising IMS
(OpenID) for the purpose of the discussion of the
LIIM framework in section 5.
Some recurring concepts that will be used through-
out this paper are the users, the identity providers
(IdP) and the relying parties (RP). The users are the
ones that use IMetSs. The IdPs are the entities that
are trusted to provide and vouch for the users’ iden-
tity information. The RPs are the entities that need
to consume the users’ identity information provided
by the IdPs. For example, an online shopping website
(RP) needs to know a user’s identity and payment-
related information from the user’s bank (IdP) before
a transaction can be completed.
2.1 OpenID
An example of an IMS that will be used through-
out this paper is OpenID. In the OpenID Authenti-
cation scheme (Recordon & Fitzpatrick 2006), a user’s
unique identifier is in the form of a URL, called the
Identifier URL. When an RP needs to authenticate
a user, the user is normally presented with a special
HTML form field with the name ‘openid url’. The
Identifier URL that the user enters into this HTML
form field will resolve into an HTML document, with
the HEAD section of the document pointing to the
user’s IdP for authentication service. The RP will
then send a ‘check id’ message to the IdP to authen-
ticate the user, by a redirect message through the
user’s browser. The IdP will then try to authenti-
cate the user (if not already authenticated) and send
the response back to the RP containing an assertion
about the user’s claimed Identifier URL. In addition,
the RP can also include - by piggybacking into the
‘check id’ message, a request for additional attributes
of the user.
2.2 Microsoft’s CardSpace
CardSpace (Chappell 2006, Microsoft 2005b) is the
latest identity management system from Microsoft
that is included in the Microsoft’s Vista operating
system. CardSpace claims to be an IMetS (Microsoft
2005a). Users of the CardSpace system normally have
a set of ‘cards’. Each of these cards contains a col-
lection of users’ personal information, such as name,
address, and age. The cards can be generated by the
users themselves (that is, the users are the IdPs - also
called Personal cards), or by external IdPs who have
the authority to vouch for the users’ identity informa-
tion (also called Managed cards). The general flows
of CardSpace system is provided in Figure 1.
Assume that a user wants to access a service from
an RP, but before the service can be granted, the
RP needs some information about the user. In this
case, the user’s CardSpace client will first retrieve the
RP’s policies regarding the required information of
the user, the way to format the user’s information in
the way that the RP can consume, the security re-
quirements, as well as the type of card required (Per-
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1. Retrieve RP token requirements
RP’s token requirements
3. Retrieve IdP token issuance policy
5. Requested Token is sent to RP
4. WS−Trust message exchange to retrieve the required Token.
The chosen card information is included in the request 
message, and a token consumable by RP is returned
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Figure 1: Simplified CardSpace Flow
sonal or Managed). The policies can be retrieved from
the RP using the WS-Metadata Exchange protocol
(Microsoft et al. 2006). The policy itself is defined us-
ing the WS-Security Policy language (OASIS 2007).
Alternatively, the policy can be directly embedded
into an HTML page using the CardSpace-compatible
HTML object tags.
After a successful evaluation of the policies, the
user’s CardSpace client will then display a set of cards
that satisfy the RP’s policies for the user to choose.
After a card is chosen, the CardSpace client will con-
tact the IdP (who generated the chosen card) to is-
sue a token that represents the user’s information.
This normally requires the client to again retrieve
the IdP’s policies regarding the token issuance, fol-
lowed by aWS-Trust (OASIS 2006) message exchange
with the IdP. The WS-Trust token request message
includes information about the required token for-
mat, the user’s information, and other information
required for a successful CardSpace-compatible token
issuance. The WS-Trust response message from the
IdP to the CardSpace client will include the requested
token which will then be sent to the RP.
As an IMetS, CardSpace has many shortcomings
which would make the integration with various IMSs
problematic. The main problem with CardSpace is
its rigid design that imposes many requirements on
those who want to use and integrate with CardSpace.
It requires specific methods to express the RPs and
IdPs policies (by using the WS-Security Policy lan-
guage, or its HTML object tags). CardSpace also re-
quires the token request and response to be conducted
in a CardSpace-compatible manner. For example, a
CardSpace-compatible IdP will not be able to han-
dle a token request expressed in a non-CardSpace-
compatible format, even though the request could be
expressed using the same WS-Trust protocol.
CardSpace is also unable to support integration
of various IMS protocols. For example, when a user
goes to an RP that uses the OpenID authentication
protocol, the CardSpace client will not be able to rec-
ognize the special HTML form field tag with the name
’openid url’ as an indication that the OpenID authen-
tication protocol is used. Thus, the user in this case
will have to fill in their OpenID Identifier URL man-
ually and be made aware that a different IMS is being
used, rendering the main goal of IMetS unachievable.
2.3 Higgins Trust Framework
Higgins Trust Framework 1 (Eclipsepedia 2006b,
2007a, Ruddy et al. 2006) is a platform and identity
protocol independent software framework that could
integrate various IMSs, existing or new ones in order
to provide more convenience, privacy and security to
the users. The architecture of Higgins is made up of
many components. For our discussion, the important
ones are: Identity Attribute Service(IdAS), Context
Provider (CP), Token Service(TS), Token Provider
1Higgins website: http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/
(TP), I-Card, RP Protocol support (RPPS), I-Card
Selector Service (ISS), and Higgins Browser Exten-
sion (HBX).
The browser extension (HBX) (Eclipsepedia
2007b) with the ISS Web client or a richer GUI ISS
Client are used to handle user authentication and
other identity related interactions between the users,
the RPs and the IdPs. When an RP needs a user’s
identity information, the user with Higgins installed
will be presented with a set of graphical cards (called
I-Cards) that contain their identity information and
other related information (such as the issuer of the
card) that can be used for this particular RP. The
user then chooses an I-Card that they feel most com-
fortable to be used with the RP.
The ISS (Eclipsepedia 2007d) is the component
that is used to assess the I-Cards that can be used for
a particular interaction between a user and an RP (or
IdP). It contains a Policy engine that is responsible
for matching the RP’s policy with a set of I-Card(s)
that could satisfy the policies. Various policy classes
can be developed to handle various policy expressions.
The usable I-Cards will then be displayed for the users
to choose.
Most RPs need to interact with users when they
need to retrieve their information. To do this, an
IMS-specific protocol is used. To help the users’ agent
to be able to handle the various IMS protocols em-
ployed by the RPs, Higgins provides the RPPS com-
ponent which enables the users’ agent to understand
the various RPs protocols. Therefore, the actual pro-
tocols differences are hidden from the users.
From the users’ perspective, I-Cards (Eclipsepe-
dia 2007c) are the standard representation of their
personal information. They contain information such
as the issuers of the card, the users’ personal infor-
mation, and other information. Higgins provides an
I-Card interface to support different types of cards.
I-Card providers are responsible for writing the plug-
ins for their respective I-Cards.
From the IdP’s view, the TS (Token Service) is
the main component that provides a standard in-
terface that accepts requests for tokens from vari-
ous RPs. The Higgins TS architecture is sophisti-
cated enough to handle various token requests in a
platform-independent manner. However, Higgins’ TS
is implemented using the WS-Trust language. Thus,
token requests not expressed in WS-Trust protocol
may not work. TS relies on TP (Token Provider) plu-
gins to provide support for the generation of various
token types, such as SAML, Kerberos, and X509.
The TS gets the required credential data of a user
to generate the token from the IdAS service. CP
(Eclipsepedia 2006a) is the plugin component to en-
able the users’ information retrieval from various un-
derlying sources, and IdAS (Eclipsepedia 2007e) is
the ‘interface’ that acts as the wrapper of CPs to
provide a common credential service. The services
that IdAS provides mainly involve the management of
digital subjects, including addition, deletion, editing,
credential retrievals and so on. For example, several
CPs can be plugged in to handle various credential re-
trieval/modification protocols, such as LDAP, SAML
Attribute Query, and others.
As an IMetS, the design of Higgins is flexible
enough to allow a good integration potential with var-
ious IMSs. Components such as TS and IdAS act as
a wrapper to support various token types to be re-
quested and generated by developing the necessary
TP plugins. Similarly, various CPs can be written to
support various protocols to retrieve users’ informa-
tion, such as through LDAP protocol.
Nevertheless, Higgins’ Token Service only supports
WS-Trust protocol. In many existing IMS, such as
OpenID and Liberty, the request for a user’s token is
not expressed in WS-Trust form. This might not be a
problem since the protocol flows of both OpenID and
Liberty work in such a way that the token request
is forwarded from the RP to IdP directly. However,
the Higgins’ TS will fail if there is an IMS, similar to
CardSpace, that generates a request for a token (after
a user chooses an I-Card to be used) expressed in a
non-WS-Trust protocol.
2.4 The Need for LIIM Framework
Section 2.2 and section 2.3 show that both CardSpace
and Higgins, in their attempts to provide a seamless
integration of various IMS, manage to do so up to a
point, but not a complete and seamless integration as
an ideal IMetS should. However, assessing an IMetS
capability is difficult as normally IMetS has a compli-
cated structure, not to mention the various aspects of
IMS that an IMetS integrates.
Therefore, to help with this assessment, the LIIM
framework is proposed in this paper. The LIIM
framework breaks an IMetS into five layers, each layer
with its own set of properties that an ‘ideal’ IMetS
should have. The LIIM framework allows a structured
dissection of various aspects of an IMetS into layers
to aid the assessment of the IMetS integration capa-
bility. It allows assessment of the layers of an IMetS
that are problematic, and provides insights into why
they are problematic. In addition, the LIIM frame-
work can also be used as the benchmark to guide de-
velopers in building, or improving, a new or existing
IMetS. Finally, using the LIIM framework allows a
measurement of the ‘depth’ of an IMetS’s integration
capability.
2.4.1 Previous IMS Models
There are some attempts to model IMS, such as those
proposed by Mont et al. (Mont et al. 2002) and Over-
beek (Overbeek 2006). Mont et al. model IMS as a
three-layer structure, consisting of the Identity Man-
agement Infrastructure at the lowest level, the Iden-
tity Management Lifecycle on the second layer, and
the Added-value Tools and Solutions at the top layer.
The infrastructure layer (lowest layer) is responsible
for the basic identity management operations, such
as authentication, single sign-on, and access control.
The lifecycle layer (middle-layer) is responsible for
providing a mechanism for the creation, certification
and evolution of identity information over a period
of time. The Added-value Tools and Solutions (top
layer) provides tools and services to simplify the op-
erational usage and management of identities, such as
identity mapping, tracing and others.
There is an overlap between the Mont et al.’s and
Overbeek’s models. Overbeek’s model can be fitted
into the Mont et al’s Identity Management Infras-
tructure layer (lowest layer). However, Overbeek’s
model is more detailed in that it breaks that layer into
3 tiers: Authentication (at the base), Identification
(middle) and Authorization (at the top). The actual
model is more elaborate, but in summary, it implies
that authentication is needed to identify a user for
service access authorization.
These models, while valid, are models for IMS, not
for IMetS. The layering is based on IMS functionali-
ties. However, these models are not useful to assess
IMetS because the goal of IMetS is not, as explained
in section 1, to replace or modify the functionalities
of IMS, but instead, to provide a framework to join
various IMSs in order to provide a single consistent
user interface for users in their identity management
activities. As a result of this modeling approach,
Mont et al.’s and Overbeek’s models depict the Iden-
tity Management Infrastructure layer as a group of
services such as authentication, single sign-on, and
others, without any finer layering. However, implicit
in this layer itself are layers that support and enable
those Identity Management Infrastructure function-
alities. It is at this layer that IMetS works to join the
various IMSs and that LIIM models.
3 Layered Identity Infrastructure Model -
LIIM
LIIM refers to the layers that an ideal IMetS should
support. LIIM is derived from an observation of the
IMetSs. From this observation, the infrastructure of
an IMetS is identified and a model of the layerings
that an ideal IMetS should have to be able to integrate
various IMSs seamlessly is developed.
LIIM is made up of five layers, the Presentation,
Protocol, Policy, Token and Credential Data Source
layers. In this section, each layer will be described
and the properties of each layer as they apply to
IMetS will be listed. The properties are described
from generic to specific. The usage of this model in
order to assess an IMetS integration capability will
be detailed in section 4.
3.1 Presentation Layer
The main concern of this layer is how to present
the identity management systems to users. That is,
this layer has to provide a usable interface for users
to interact with. As this is the main point of con-
tact between a user and an IMetS, the presentation
layer needs to provide a concise information about
the user’s Personal Identifiable Information (PII) that
will be released, the party to whom the PII will be
sent to, and the related policies.
As per user-centric philosophy, it is important for
users to have a consistent experience in their identity
management activities. And for IMetS, this means
that the Presentation layer should provide a single
interface for the users to use in dealing with the vari-
ety of underlying IMS. An example of this layer would
be a consistent login screen to various systems. The
properties of this layer can be summed up to:
• Presentation Property 0 (PRS-0): An
IMetS must have a single common interface for
the users to interact with regardless of the vari-
ous underlying IMSs.
• Presentation Property 1 (PRS-1): An
IMetS should have a usable user-interface. Fol-
lowing the usability principles from Jøsang et
al (Jøsang et al. 2007), a usable IMetS interface
should have the following properties:
– PRS-1.1 Users with sufficient knowledge
and practical ability must be able to under-
stand the identity-management-related ac-
tions required of them.
– PRS-1.2 The mental and physical loads to
perform the identity management activities
in using the IMetS must be tolerable, even
if it is done repeatedly.
• Presentation Property 2 (PRS-2): An
IMetS should provide a clear and concise infor-
mation about the PII used, the recipient of the
PII, and the related policies.
The Presentation layer is one of the most important
components in IMetS for it is where the users interact
with the various underlying IMSs. It is at this layer
that a user can ‘feel’ that they are dealing with a
unified system.
Both Higgins and CardSpace provide a common
interface for the users. Therefore, the property PRS-
0 is fulfilled. In Higgins, by using the card-metaphor,
it is hoped that it makes the presentation more us-
able as users normally are familiar with using cards
in their daily life transactions (such as presenting a
driver’s license card to prove age). The concept of us-
ing ‘cards’ as a source for identity information is quite
intuitive, thus PRS-1.1 is satisfied. The activities re-
quired to use the I-Cards are tolerable (choosing the
cards to use and clicking them). Therefore, PRS-1.2
is satisfied. In this manner, PRS-1 is satisfied.
The user-interface provides information about the
PII included in that I-Card and the RP that the infor-
mation on that I-Card will be sent to. Only I-Cards
that fulfill the Policy requirements are selectable by
the users. Thus, this layer also fulfills PRS-2.
CardSpace’s Prsentation layer is very similar to
Higgins. The card-metaphor is hoped to provide a
usable user-interface, and thus, fulfillment of PRS-
1. The CardSpace’s interface provides information
about the IdP that issued the card, which RP the
card is to be used, claims information, and only cards
that fulfill the RP’s Policy requirements are displayed
and usable, thus PRS-2 is satisfied.
3.2 Protocol Layer
The Protocol layer of an IMetS handles various iden-
tity management protocols, such as the OpenID Au-
thentication protocol (see section 2.1), SAML 2.0 Sin-
gle Sign-on protocol, and many others. For an IMetS
to be able to support integration with various IMS,
the ability to understand and act accordingly with
various IMS protocols is crucial.
An identity management protocol normally in-
volves interaction with the users, RPs and IdPs. Con-
sequently, the various protocols for conducting vari-
ous IMS-related activities (authentication, token re-
quest and policy exchange and others), should be un-
derstood by the IMetS. Therefore, the properties that
an IMetS should have at this layer are:
• Protocol Property 0 (PROT-0): An IMetS
must support at least a protocol that can be used
to aid the communication between the users, RPs
and IdPs.
• Protocol Property 1 (PROT-1): An IMetS
should be able to handle the protocol interac-
tion between the users and the RPs, regardless
of the variety of the protocols used. The required
processing that users need to perform from this
protocol interaction should be understood by the
IMetS system and should be reflected accord-
ingly to the Presentation layer and to the users.
• Protocol Property 2 (PROT-2): An IMetS
should be able to handle the protocol interac-
tion between the users and the IdPs, regardless
of the variety of the protocols used. The required
processing that users need to perform from this
protocol interaction should be understood by the
IMetS system and should be reflected accord-
ingly to the Presentation layer and to the users.
• Protocol Property 3 (PROT-3): An IMetS
should be able to handle the protocol interaction
between the RPs and the IdPs, regardless of the
variety of the protocols used. An IdP should be
able to understand and act accordingly to an in-
teraction using various RP protocols.
Higgins provides support, to an extent, for multi-
ple IMS protocols to be used. Therefore, PROT-0 is
satisfied. In Higgins, PROT-1 is satisfied by the use
of the RPPS component which is an interface that al-
lows the Higgins users’ agent to understand the vari-
ous RPs’ protocols.
Based on the design of Higgins, the possible inter-
action between the users and the IdPs is when a user
chooses an I-Card, and a token request is sent to the
IdP. Higgins uses the WS-Trust protocol in this inter-
action. Therefore, PROT-2 is not satisfied because if
a token request is not done using the WS-Trust lan-
guage, then a Higgins IdP will not be able to handle
it. Similarly, this also applies to interaction between
IdPs and RPs, thus PROT-3 is also not satisfied.
CardSpace provides a specific protocol that has to
be used by users, RPs and IdPs. Therefore, PRS-
0 is satisfied. However, the integration at this layer
is very restrictive. Users that use CardSpace system
cannot handle RPs that do not express their proto-
cols in a CardSpace-compatible manner (such as the
use of WS-Metadata Exchange protocol to retrieve
the RP’s policy). Therefore, PROT-1 is not satisfied.
Interaction between a user and an IdP, and between
an RP and an IdP in CardSpace is similar to Higgins,
therefore PROT-2 and PROT-3 are also not satisfied.
3.3 Policy Layer
This layer is responsible for handling the policies that
are associated with the use of one’s PII (Personal
Identifiable Information). Policy is a broad term that
encompasses various aspects. For users, this could
be as simple as their privacy requirements and the
PII that they are willing to disclose. For IdPs and
RPs, the policies could be the sort of PII required,
the strength of the assertion required, and their pri-
vacy policies to be associated with the use of the PII.
For IMetS, this layer should be able to handle var-
ious policy definitions expressed in a variety of for-
mats. For example, an RP might use P3P (Cranor
et al. 2002) as the language to describe their privacy
policy, while other RPs might use other expressions.
IMetS should be able to understand these various pol-
icy expressions so that they can be handled accord-
ingly. The properties for IMetS at this layer are:
• Policy Property 0 (POL-0): An IMetS must
be able to handle the RPs’, IdPs’, and if appli-
cable, users’ policy expressions.
• Policy Property 1 (POL-1): An IMetS should
be able to understand various RPs’, IdPs’ and,
if applicable, users’ policies expressed in various
formats.
• Policy Property 2 (POL-2): An IMetS should
not impose its own policy expression format be-
cause this will cause unnecessary changes on the
RPs and IdPs sides to express their policies in an
IMetS-conformant manner.
To further clarify, the enforcement of the policies
should be done by IMetS. Although IMetS does not
impose its own security requirements, IMetS should
enforce the policy requirements. The policy require-
ments should be reflected in the Presentation layer,
as per PRS-2. How this is done depends on the de-
sign of the IMetS. Of course, the ability of an IMetS
to understand and handle RPs and IdPs policies also
depends on its ability to support the protocols that
are used to carry the policies.
In both Higgins and CardSpace, there are ways
to understand and handle the RPs and IdPs policy
expressions. Therefore, POL-0 is satisfied.
In Higgins, various policy styles can be included in
the ISS Policy engine. In this manner, POL-1 is sat-
isfied. Higgins does not define its own policy expres-
sion style. Instead, the ISS Policy engine understands
various policy expressions without imposing its own.
Therefore, POL-2 is also satisfied. The enforcement
of policies is achieved by allowing users to use only
those cards that satisfy the given policies.
CardSpace, on the other hand, does not support
various policies other than those expressed in WS-
Policy format or embedded HTML policy expressed
in CardSpace-specific object tags. Thus POL-1 is not
satisfied. Since CardSpace imposes its own policy
style, POL-2 is also not satisfied.
3.4 Token Layer
This layer is responsible for the representation of
users’ PII into a token. The token in itself does
not represent any functionality (such as authentica-
tion). It is merely a representation of users’ PII, either
vouched for by an IdP or claims that users make. Of
course a token can be used to facilitate various iden-
tity related services, however, those services happen
at layers above this. There are many token styles
that can be used to represent users’ PII, depending
on the IMS used, such as SAML (Security Assertion
Markup Language) token, certificates, LDAP’s LDIF
representation, and many others. This is a very im-
portant layer that all IMetS should support.
In IMetS, this layer deals with various token for-
mats. Requests for a token comes from an RP to an
IdP, or from a user to an IdP, expressed in various
formats. The response for the token request should
be formatted in a way that the RP can use. For
users, there should be a standard representation of
their identity information regardless of which IMS is
used. This layer’s properties are:
• Token Property 0 (TOK-0): An IMetS has a
support for requesting and generating a token to
represent a user’s identity information.
• Token Property 1 (TOK-1): An IMetS
should provide a consistent representation of the
user’s PII to the users, regardless of where or how
the actual information is stored or represented.
• Token Property 2 (TOK-2): An IMetS
should provide a common service for token re-
quests that accepts token requests expressed in
various protocols.
– Token Property 2.1 (TOK-2.1): An
IMetS should be able to accept token re-
quests expressed using various formats of a
particular protocol.
• Token Property 3 (TOK-3): An IMetS
should be able to generate various token types
as required.
Both Higgins and CardSpace provide support for
token generation at this layer. Therefore, property
TOK-0 is fulfilled.
For users, this layer could be represented as a stan-
dard web page with standardized format in represent-
ing their PII. Or, as what CardSpace and Higgins do,
this can be represented using the ‘Card’ metaphor.
Information stored in Cards is also known as claim:
a statement about a user’s PII, such as name, gender,
address, and so on. In this way, the TOK-1 property
is fulfilled by both CardSpace and Higgins.
However, RPs may require assertions that the
claims are valid. To do this, RPs can make requests
to IdPs (whom they trust) to generate tokens that
contain the users’ information (vouched for by the
IdPs). The tokens generated by the IdPs need to be
in the form consumable by the RPs. Depending on
the RPs, sometimes they might accept tokens that
are validated by the users themselves (the IdP is also
the user). On other occasions, RPs might prefer the
users’ claim to be asserted by external IdPs that they
trust. In an on-line shopping scenario, the RP would
most likely prefer to have a bank to assert the cor-
rectness of a user’s credit card information.
In Higgins, the TS is the main component that
provides a standard interface that accepts requests for
tokens from various RPs. The Higgins TS architec-
ture is sophisticated enough to handle various token
requests in a platform-independent manner. In this
sense, TOK-2.1 is satisfied. However, Higgins only
supports token requests using the WS-Trust proto-
col, therefore, property TOK-2 is not satisfied. TS
allows various plugins to be added to enable the gen-
eration of various token types, such as SAML, X509
and so on. In this way, Higgins also fulfills the TOK-3
property.
Similar to Higgins, CardSpace-style cards pro-
vide a standard representation of the user’s PII to
user, thus, TOK-1 is satisfied. Similar to Higgins,
CardSpace only supports token requests expressed us-
ing the WS-Trust langauge. Therefore, TOK-2 prop-
erty is violated. However, unlike Higgins, CardSpace
requires that a token request using WS-Trust must
be formatted in the CardSpace-compatible manner
according to the CardSpace technical specifications.
Therefore, TOK-2.1 is also violated. CardSpace spec-
ification states that IdPs should be able to generate
various token types, thus TOK-3 is satisfied.
3.5 Credential Data Layer
This layer is responsible for providing the mechanism
to handle the registration, retrieval, deletion, modifi-
cation and other operations on users’ PII to support
operations on the layers above it. The Token layer, in
generating various tokens, normally accesses services
from this layer to retrieve the actual users’ credential
data. This layer of IMetS provides an interface to al-
low a common way of accessing users’ credential data
sources implemented using various technologies (such
as whether the data source is to be accessed using
the LDAP system, simple XML files, databases, or
federated using the SAML Attribute Query method).
From the IdP’s view, a common way is needed to
access these various credential systems. Since this
layer provides services to layers above it, it has to
have a consistent public fac¸ade to allow layers above
it to access its services. Failure to do so would cause
the layers above it to have to change or adopt a vari-
ety of implementation methods to communicate with
the Credential layer. For example, an IdP uses LDAP
as its credential system, and the token layer thus uses
the LDAP protocol to communicate with this layer.
However, the Token layer might also have to retrieve
user’s data from another credential system (an ex-
ternal entity) using SAML Attribute Query (OASIS
2005) protocol, and this would cause the Token layer
to have to adapt to this protocol manually. If this
layer is abstracted with a common fac¸ade to provide
common access methods, then the token layer can ac-
cess this credential system using a consistent method.
By doing so, there is an elegant stream-lined process
in handling identity management activities for all in-
volved parties (users, RPs and IdPs).
Therefore, the properties for this layer are:
• Credential Property 0 (CRED-0): Users’
credential data must be able to be retrieved by
parties who need the data.
• Credential Property 1 (CRED-1): An
IMetS should provide an common facade to han-
dle the common operations of user’s PII regard-
less of the actual data source systems used.
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• Credential Property 2 (CRED-2): An
IMetS should not impose its own method to han-
dle users’ credential data source.
There are specific methods employed in Higgins
to enable users’ credential data retrieval. The CP
(Eclipsepedia 2006a) is the plugin component for dif-
ferent types of credential data source systems, and
IdAS (Eclipsepedia 2007e) is the ‘interface’ that acts
as the wrapper for CPs to provide a common cre-
dential services to layers above it. The services that
IdAS provides mainly involve the management of digi-
tal subjects, including addition, deletion, editing, cre-
dential retrievals and so on. For example, several
CPs can be plugged in to handle various credential re-
trieval/modification protocols, such as LDAP, SAML
Attribute Query, and others. By doing so, Higgins
allows the Token layer component (TS) to retrieve
the required credential data for an entity to gener-
ate the token from the IdAS service in a standard
manner without having to worry about the unnec-
essary details. In this manner, Higgins fulfills the
CRED-1 property. In addition, Higgins does not im-
pose any specific methods to handle users’ PII data
source, therefore, CRED-2 is also satisfied.
As for CardSpace, there is no integration effort
at this layer. Thus, CRED-1 and CRED-2 properties
are not fulfilled. Nevertheless, CRED-0 is still fulfilled
as the IdPs are still able to retrieve users’ credential
data, despite in a non-integrated manner.
A summary of the components of Higgins and
CardSpace and how they fit into the LIIM framework
is provided in Figure 2.
4 LIIM Usage
The previous section 3 describes the properties that
an ideal IMetS should have. However, how this model
should be used has not been discussed. For simplicity,
several details have been left out in the description of
the LIIM framework, but which will be elaborated in
this section.
4.1 Types of Integration
Certain properties of LIIM apply at the users’ side,
while others apply at the IdPs’ side. This is be-
cause by using the LIIM framework, we can access
an IMetS’s integration ability at both the users’ and
IdPs’ side. The underlying assumptions with using
IMetS are as follows:
1. The RPs are allowed to use whatever IMS sys-
tem they prefer. Hence, they do not attempt
to have any integration of various IMS. Conse-
quently, IMetS at the RPs’ side is not relevant,
though some modification might have to be done
for the RP to be able to talk to users using cer-
tain IMetS.
2. The IMetS at the users’ side should be able to
integrate various IMS that the RPs and the IdPs
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use to enable a seamless users’ experience when
interacting with both the IdPs and the RPs.
3. The IdPs may not have to support integration of
various IMSs, although it is desirable if they do.
For the third assumption, some may question the
necessity for the IdPs to provide the integration of
various IMSs. After all, what has happened up till
now is that most IdPs only use one type of IMS. By
enabling integration of various IMSs at the IdPs side,
we can have a truly interoperable identity manage-
ment system. In this scenario, an RP does not have
to support a specific IMS to be able to receive identity
assertion vouched for by a certain IdP. Therefore, an
RP could choose to use whatever IMS system they
prefer and still have the IdP be able to provide seam-
less interoperability support.
Based on these assumptions, there are two main
types of IMetS integration:
1. Integration at the users’ side. Users are unaware
of the underlying differences in the various IMSs
used by the RPs and the IdPs. Users have a con-
sistent experience in their identity management
activities.
2. Integration at the IdPs’ side. This can be further
subdivided into two types:
(a) IdPs’ integration with various RPs’ IMS
systems. IdPs can support requests for
users identity information from RPs using
various IMSs.
(b) IdPs’ integration with various RPs’ systems
and with various credential data source sys-
tems. In this case, there is a streamlined in-
tegration from the RPs to the IdPs commu-
nication all the way to how the IdPs should
access the data source systems to retrieve
the users’ PII for the RPs.
Based on these types of integrations, the LIIM
framework properties can be divided into those that
are exclusive to the users and the IdPs, and those that
apply to both the users and the IdPs. IMetS at the
RPs’ side is not relevant due to the first assumption.
Referring to Figure 3, some properties are exclusive
for the users, some are exclusive for the IdPs, while
others are relevant to both. The Presentation layer is
not relevant for the IdP because it is expected that
the IdP will handle interactions with the users and
RPs programmatically. The Credential data source
layer is not relevant to the users because this layer
handles users’ PII data storage operations and data
retrieval for token generation vouched by the IdPs.
4.2 LIIM Framework for IMetS Assessment
One of the main purposes of the LIIM Framework
is for evaluating an IMetS system. An assessment
can be conducted to determine whether an IMetS can
provide integration at the users and IdPs sides.
4.2.1 Assessing IMetS Integration for Users
Evaluation of an IMetS ability to provide a seamless
user experience on the users’ side can be conducted
as follows:
• For each of the relevant LIIM layers, evaluate if
an IMetS fulfills those properties that are appli-
cable to the users’ side, as shaded in Figure 3.
The evaluation of those properties should result
to a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’.
• Trace the evaluation tree for each layer as pro-
vided in Figure 4 to obtain the evaluation for
that particular layer. Assign the value of 0 if it
results to ‘No Support’, 1 if it results to ‘Very
Restrictive Support’, 2 if it results to ‘Some Re-
strictions’, and 3 if it results to ‘Good Support’.
• Combine the result of each layer’s evaluation to
calculate the overall IMetS integration capability
on the user’s side as explained in section 4.2.3.
Figure 4 shows the evaluation path for both Higgins
and CardSpace, and the results of their respective
evaluation at each layer are also shown.
4.2.2 Assessing IMetS Integration for IdP
A similar evaluation procedure is done for assessing an
IMetS integration capability at the IdP’s side. How-
ever, this time the properties relevant to IdPs will be
assessed as per Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows the evaluation path for both Hig-
gins and CardSpace, and the results of their respec-
tive evaluation at each layer are also shown.
4.2.3 Overall IMetS Evaluation
For an overall evaluation of an IMetS’s integration at
either the user or the IdP’s side, the following proce-
dure applies: If evaluation of any of the layers resulted
in 0, then it means that the integration efforts will fail.
Else, an average score will be calculated from each of
the layers to derive an overall value of anywhere be-
tween 1 (very restrictive integration - many integra-
tion efforts will fail) to 3 (good integration support,
integration will very likely to succeed).
Overall evaluation of an IMetS is done using the
same approach for both the evaluation at the user’s
side and the IdP’s side. The only difference is that
for the user’s side, the layers involved are the Presen-
tation, Protocol, Policy and Token layers, while for
the IdP’s side, the layers involved are the Protocol,
Policy, Token and Credential layers.
None of the layers for Higgins and CardSpace in-
tegration evaluation (both for user’s and IdP’s sides)
results to a score of 0. The overall calculation of the
Higgins and CardSpace integration score is shown in
Table 1.
IMetS System Side Overall Score
CardSpace User’s side 3+1+1+3/4=2
IdP’s side 1+1+1+1/4=1
Higgins User’s side 3+2+3+3/4=2.75
IdP’s side 1+3+2+3/4=2.25
Table 1: Overall CardSpace and Higgins Evaluation
The overall evaluation results can be interpreted
as follows: CardSpace has an average integration sup-
port on the user’s side (overall score of 2), therefore,
there will be some cases where integration efforts will
fail. CardSpace’s integration support at the IdP side
is very restrictive (overall score of 1), therefore, most
integration efforts will fail. For Higgins, it has a very
YY
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N NY Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N N
Y
YN
N
 G o o d  
S u p p o r t
   S o m e  
R e s t r i c t i o n s
V e r y  R e s t r i c t i v e
      Suppor t
   No  
S u p p o r t
P R S - 2P R S - 2P R S - 2
P R S - 1 . 2P R S - 1 . 2
P R S - 1 . 1
P R S - 0
N
P R O T - 2
P R O T - 1
P R O T - 0
   No  
S u p p o r t
V e r y  R e s t r i c t i v e
      Suppor t
   S o m e  
R e s t r i c t i o n s
 G o o d  
S u p p o r t
P R O T - 2
H i g g i n s
C a r d S p a c e ,
S c o r e  =  3
H i g g i n s ,
S c o r e  =  2
C a r d S p a c e ,
S c o r e  =  1
P O L - 0
P O L - 1
P O L - 2
   No  
S u p p o r t
V e r y  R e s t r i c t i v e
      Suppor t
   S o m e  
R e s t r i c t i o n s
 G o o d  
S u p p o r t
H i g g i n s ,
S c o r e  =  3
C a r d S p a c e ,
S c o r e  =  1
T O K - 0
T O K - 1
 G o o d  
S u p p o r t
   S o m e  
R e s t r i c t i o n s
   No  
S u p p o r t
H i g g i n s
C a r d S p a c e ,
S c o r e  =  3
H i g g i n s  E v a l u a t i o n  P a t h C a r d S p a c e  E v a l u a t i o n  P a t h
Figure 4: IMetS User’s Side Integration Evaluation
good integration support at the user’s side (overall
score of 2.75), though there will be very few cases
where integration effort will fail. Higgins has an av-
erage integration support for the IdP’s side (score of
2.25), therefore some integration efforts will fail.
5 LIIM Framework Discussion
To show the validity of the LIIM framework, an
OpenID Authentication integration scenario will be
provided. An RP is using the OpenID Authentica-
tion protocol interacting with two types of users and
IdPs, one uses CardSpace, while the other uses Hig-
gins. Using the same integration scenario, the valid-
ity of LIIM framework will also be further argued by
showing how it can be used as a tool to design or
improve a new or existing IMetS, as well as to aid
understanding of a complicated IMetS.
5.1 User’s Side Integration Scenario
When a Higgins user goes to the RP site using a
browser, the HBX component would call the RPPS
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component to detect that a returned HTML page
is request for the OpenID authentication (because
the HTML page will contain a form with a field
named ’openid url’, which is recommended in the
OpenID 1.1 specification). Recognizing that this
is an OpenID authentication, the RPPS (Protocol
layer) and ISS Policy class component (Policy layer)
along with other supporting components will evalu-
ate which I-Card (Token layer) that can be used for
this RP. Assume that there is an I-Card for OpenID
that contains the user’s OpenID Identifier URL, the
ISS Policy engine will evaluate usable I-Cards and
present them through the ISS Web UI (Presentation
layer). Upon selecting the appropriate I-Card con-
taining the user’s OpenID identifier, the RPPS could
automatically fill in the ’openid url’ field with the
URL identifier from the card selected and return the
HTML form to the RP. By doing so, a Higgins user
can have a seamless integrated experience and should
be unaware that an OpenID Authentication has been
used.
This is consistent with our evaluation result of Hig-
gin’s integration capability from section 4.2.1. The
Protocol layer evaluates to ‘some restrictions’ which
means we may or may not expect integration prob-
lems. In this case, we did not. However, this is be-
cause the property PROT-2 does not apply as there
is no direct communication between the user and the
IdP in the OpenID Authentication protocol. The Pre-
sentation, Policy and Token layers evaluate to a score
of 3, thus no integration problem is expected at those
layers, which is exactly the case in this scenario.
With CardSpace, however, the Policy and Pro-
tocol layers evaluate to ‘very restrictive’. Thus, we
should expect a good chance of integration failure. In
CardSpace, the user agent does not have the support
component, such as RPPS in Higgins, to detect that
the RP sent an OpenID authentication request and
the CardSpace policy engine will not be able to find
CardSpace-style cards that can be used with this RP.
In short, the Presentation layer of CardSpace becomes
useless (although we evaluated it to have a ‘good sup-
port’) because the Protocol layer does not support
any other request from RP except if it was expressed
in CardSpace-compatible manner. In this situation,
the user, therefore, has to be presented with a tradi-
tional HTML form to fill in their URL identifier.
5.2 IdP’s Side Integration Scenario
Next in the OpenID Authentication protocol, the RP
would find the IdP based on the given URL iden-
tifier and send a ’check id’ request. However, in
both CardSpace and Higgins, the IdP’s side Protocol
layer integration evaluation results in ‘very restric-
tive support’. Thus, we can expect that integration
of OpenID Authentication protocol at the IdP side
will most likely fail.
In Higgins, the ‘check id’ request sent from the
RP to the IdP will not be understood as Higgins’ IdP
does not have any support for PROT-3 (the proto-
col interaction between RP and IdP). Therefore, the
integration will fail at this point. Integration assess-
ment at other layers are thus irrelevant. In fact, this
is exactly what happened. In the OSIS (Open-Source
Identity System) interoperability space2, Higgins is
not involved at all in the interaction between OpenID
RP and IdP. A similar thing would happen to an IdP
that uses the CardSpace system.
5.3 Identification of Missing or Problematic
Components
From section 5.1, we know that CardSpace has prob-
lems with user’s side integration with OpenID. By
using the LIIM Framework, it is straightforward to
see that the missing components that cause the inte-
gration problem is the lack of support for PROT-1,
POL-1 and POL-2 properties in CardSpace. Thus,
what needs to be done is to add components in
CardSpace that can handle various RP protocols and
policy expressions, instead of those expressed using
CardSpace-compatible format only.
Similarly, for a seamless integration at the IdP’s
side, the most obvious missing component for both
CardSpace and Higgins is the component to support
PROT-3 property (the protocol support for commu-
nication between RP and IdP).
5.4 Improvement of IMetS
We have now identified the need to develop compo-
nents that would provide PROT-3, PROT-1, POL-1
and POL-2 to CardSpace. However, this may not be
2http://osis.netmesh.org/wiki/Interop_Use_Cases
enough. Using the LIIM Framework, it is straight-
forward to identify which other components that we
might need.
For every layer that evaluates to a score of 1 or
lower, it is very likely that new component(s) will
have to be developed so that the evaluation will re-
sult in a score of 2 or higher (because a score of 2
indicates at least a reasonable integration support for
that layer, despite still having some restrictions). For
example, for CardSpace integration at the IdP’s side,
not only do we need to develop support for PROT-
3, we also need to provide support for TOK-2.1 in
order to have the Token layer evaluation to result in
the score of 2. Depending on the improvement goal,
property TOK-2 may also have to be supported if the
goal is to have the Token layer evaluation to result in
a score of 3. Similar process applies to Higgins as
well.
5.5 Better Understanding of IMetS Prob-
lems
Using the LIIM framework, a better understanding
an IMetS’s problems is possible. The LIIM frame-
work isolates problems into their respective layers.
Thus, instead of grouping problems indiscriminately,
the LIIM framework allows a clear and elegant way
to describe and understand IMetS problems.
For example, we know that CardSpace has a prob-
lem with integration at the user’s side. By using the
LIIM framework, we have evaluated the CardSpace
Protocol and Policy layers to a score of 1, while the
Presentation layer of CardSpace evalutes to a score of
3. These evaluations tell us that the actual problems
with CardSpace is not at the Presentation layer, but
lies on the Protocol and Policy layers. After deter-
mining the problematic layers, it is straightforward
to identify exactly the components that need to be
‘fixed’. In this case, we want CardSpace to at least
provide support for properties PROT-1 and POL-1.
5.6 Aids Understanding of Complex IMetS
The LIIM framework is also useful in aiding the un-
derstanding of a complex IMetS. For example, a first
look at Higgins Trust Framework may make it seem
very complicated. Trying to understand Higgins may
prove to be difficult as one would not know the pur-
pose of each of the Higgins’ components, and how
they all fit together to form an IMetS.
By using the LIIM framework, it allows the decom-
position of any IMetS into the its five layers. Thus,
LIIM framework makes the seemingly daunting task
of understanding a complex IMetS into a more man-
ageable task; the decomposition of IMetS into its five
layers and identifying components that fit into each
of those layers. The next step is to understand how
each of the identified components works together to
provide integration at the user’s and the IdP’S sides.
5.7 Design Benchmark for IMetS
The LIIM framework can also be used as the de-
sign benchmark for developing new IMetS. LIIM de-
scribes the necessary layers and properties that an
ideal IMetS should provide in order to achieve inte-
gration at the user’s and/or the IdP’s side, as well as
at how ‘comprehensive’ the integration should be.
Therefore, by using this framework, a designer and
developer can develop properties that they know their
IMetS should support in order to achieve a certain
integration level. For example, if a developer needs
to develop an IMetS that provides integration at the
IdP’s side with the most comprehensive Token layer
integration (a score of 3), then he/she knows that the
developed IMetS should provide support for TOK-0,
TOK-2, TOK-2.1 and TOK-3 properties.
5.8 Further Advantages of LIIM Framework
We would argue that LIIM’s IMetS framework is prac-
tical in that the layers are generally easy to identify
and properties of IMetS are straightforward enough
to be assessed for its supports or lack of them. This
framework is also extensible. The framework pro-
posed here is based on the current development of
IMetS. However, there could be additional require-
ments of IMetS in the future that are not obvious
at this stage. Extending the framework is as simple
as adding or modifying the properties for each layer,
or perhaps adding new layer as needed. Finally, this
framework is independent of any existing IMetS. Even
after Higgins or CardSpace are outdated and are not
in the market anymore, this framework can still be
used to analyze any new IMetS.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, the benefits and usefulness of LIIM’s
IMetS framework rest in the abstraction of IMetS sys-
tem into its layers. This framework can be used as
a tool to analyze and evaluate any existing or new
IMetS. The LIIM framework provides a new model of
the IMetS infrastructure layers. LIIM’s IMetS frame-
work introduces several key properties that should be
satisfied for an IMetS to be successful in integrating
various IMSs to provide users with a consistent user
experience.
This paper has also evaluated both CardSpace and
Higgins, and shows that CardSpace is a restrictive
IMetS, and thus allowing limited integration possi-
bilities, while Higgins is a more flexible IMetS, thus
able to support better integration of various IMSs,
although it still has its significant shortcomings.
LIIM framework can be used not only to assess
IMetS, but also for many other purposes, such as for
identification of missing components in an IMetS, as a
guide to improve an IMetS, as a design benchmark for
IMetS, and many others as detailed in section 5. How-
ever, one drawback of the LIIM framework is that in
determining whether an IMetS fulfills a certain prop-
erty, it requires subjective human judgment as well
as a substantial technical knowledge of the assessed
IMetS.
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